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Bank liquidity has become an important focus of financial regulatory reforms since the dangers 
of liquidity crunches became all too apparent in the recent global financial crisis. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision initiated two new liquidity standards in global banking 
regulation – the liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio (NSFR) which 
are designed to increase banks’ liquidity buffers and funding stability respectively. This 
dissertation contributes to the literature on financial intermediaries by investigating the role of 
liquidity on banks’ risk taking, financial performance, funding costs, probability of failure and 
credit risk, and by investigating stock market investors’ perceptions on bank liquidity.  
The first essay examines the relationship between funding liquidity and bank risk 
taking. Using quarterly data for US bank holding companies (BHC) from 1986 to 2014, we 
find evidence that banks with lower funding liquidity risk, as proxied by higher deposit ratios, 
take more risk. A reduction in banks’ funding liquidity risk increases bank risk, as evidenced 
by higher risk-weighted assets, greater liquidity creation and lower z-scores. However, our 
results show that bank size and capital buffers usually limit banks from taking more risk when 
they have lower funding liquidity risk. Moreover, during the global financial crisis banks with 
lower funding liquidity risk took less risk. The findings of this study have implications for bank 
regulators advocating greater liquidity and capital requirements for banks under Basel III.    
The second essay investigates the effects of liquidity creation on funding costs, 
profitability and market value in US bank holding companies. We find empirical evidence to 
suggest that bank liquidity creation lowers funding costs and improves BHC profitability and 
market value. However, our findings indicate that larger banks face higher costs of debt funding 
in response to higher liquidity creation due to their need for more expensive wholesale debt 
funding resulting in lower profitability and market values compared to smaller banks that 
remain reliant on deposit taking.  
The third essay investigates the links between asset liquidity, funding stability and the 
adjusted market-to-book value of the equity of US bank holding companies. We find that a 
reduction in banks’ liquidity risk destroys bank market value. However, a reduction in liquidity 
risk enhanced bank market value during the global financial crisis and the post-Basel III 
announcement period. Moreover, liquidity risk is inversely related to bank market value for 
large banks, for banks with higher capital buffers and for banks that are more profitable and 
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liquid. Our results indicate that there are direct regulatory costs arising from Basel III liquidity 
standards during normal times but the costs are lower during a financial crisis.  
The fourth essay investigates the links between liquidity risk and credit risk in US 
commercial banks. High funding stability and low liquidity creation indicate low liquidity risk. 
We consider the probability of failure and credit default swaps (CDS) spreads as proxies of 
banks’ credit risks. Using logit regressions, we find that a reduction in liquidity risk proxied by 
high funding stability and low liquidity creation reduces the probability of the failure of US 
commercial banks for the period from 2001–2014. We also find that increases in NSFR and 
decreases in the liquidity creation of banks that have low funding stability and high liquidity 
creation have a lower probability of failure. Using three-stage least squares (3SLS) 
simultaneous regressions, we find evidence that reductions in liquidity risk reduce banks’ credit 
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